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I. INTRODUCTION

When I joined Boston University School of Law's faculty in
1993, there seemed to be general agreement among practitioners
and academics alike that the time was ripe for some sort of uniform law to address transactions involving software. The debate
was over the form that law should take rather than whether it
should exist at all. More specifically, interested parties were discussing an important structural question-whether software
contracts might best be dealt with in the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) under a "hub and spoke" approach or as a standalone
Article. Eventually, drafters focused on a standalone Article, and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) and American Law Institute (ALI) worked for a
number of years on a new Article 2B that would be incorporated
into the UCC. When the joint effort was abandoned, NCCUSL continued the work and promulgated the eventual end product as
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).
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Debates continue today about whether or not UCITA was
successful. One might answer that question through an empirical
study of the number of software agreements that adopt UCITA as
the governing law and the importance and nature of the software
licensed under such agreements. We did not undertake such an
empirical study. We did, however, find much to admire in UCITA
and drew on it in our own work.
While I cannot speak for the ALI, I believe that the organization felt that the area was ripe for a project which does not restate the law, but rather tries to bring some order to the case law
and recommend best practices without hindering the law's adaptability to future developments. In ALI parlance, such a project is
conducted as a "Principles" project. Like a Restatement, a Principles project is drafted by "Reporters" who receive input from a
group of advisors and ALI members. Advisors are not required to
be ALI members, and represent a variety of constituencies. We
met over a 5-year period-it did not take that long, however, to
discover that serious disagreements existed, and, in some cases,
we would need to make hard choices that would likely satisfy
very few. In other words, our experience was not unlike that of
UCITA's drafters and the criticisms we received often recalled the
debates over UCITA.
I will not attempt here to mount a defense of either the
advisability of the project in the first place' or to justify all of its
provisions. Rather, I am writing here for two reasons-first, to

1The consensus for the need for a uniform law for software contracting that
ostensibly existed at the time of the UCC Article 2B effort may have eroded
over time as technology advanced, contracts became more sophisticated, and
courts addressed disputes over agreements involving software under either
common law contract or the UCC.

20 121

AL1'S PRIACIPLES OFSOFTWARE CONTRACTING

161

express my gratitude to Suffolk University Law School for conducting the day-long program on the Principles; and second, to
focus on just three areas that arose in our discussion during that
program. For those who are interested, I would recommend
reading the Principles in their entirety and drawing your own
conclusions. 2
II. SOME COMMENTS & CLARIFICATIONS
A. ContractFormation - StandardForms

At the conference, panelists objected to our provisions addressing standard form contracts. They read the relevant sections to require electronic standard forms to be presented as
clickwrap agreements. This is not, however, the Principles' approach.
We drafted provisions on contract formation against the
backdrop of a number of relevant facts. First, we recognized that
software vendors license their products in a variety of waysfrom negotiated, signed agreements to standard forms presented
as shrinkwrap, clickwrap or browsewrap agreements. Second,
we believed that courts, using common law contract and the UCC,
had begun addressing the legitimacy of different modes of contract formation in the best sense of the common law tradition.
Their decisions illustrate, unsurprisingly, that the standard form
context presents the most challenges for classical contract law.
Finally, we appreciated that, as in many areas of the Principles,
the underlying issue - contract formation particularly in an online environment-is by no means unique to software.

The text of the Principles is available from the ALL. Readers may also find interesting Volume XX of the Tulane Law Review, a symposium devoted to the
Principles.
2
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In § 2.02, we address questions of contract formation in
the context of standard form transfers of generally available
software. We define such a transaction as:

A transfer using a standard form of
(1) a small number of copies of software to an
end user; or
(2) the right to access software to a small number of end users
if the software is generally available to the public
under substantially the same terms.3
In § 2.02(b), we adopt traditional contract law-the Restatement test-as the overriding governing principle: "Atransferee adopts a standard form as a contract when a reasonable
transferor would believe the transferee intends to be bound to
the form." 4 This standard gives the courts room to continue developing the common law as they address new modes of contract
formation.
We sought, however, to enhance certainty by offering
transferors a safe harbor. The safe harbor is exactly that-a
standard that, while not required, offers the parties the certainty
of legitimacy in contract formation. As a matter of interpretation,
the safe harbor is effectively an example of when the test of §
2.01( b) is satisfied; it is not the only way to satisfy § 2.01(b). 5

3 ALI Principles § 1.01(1). Section 1.01(k] defines standard form as "a record
regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type."
4 Id. § 2.0 2 (b).
s Id. cmt. c. ("Subsection (c) prescribes best practices and constitutes a safe-

harbor provision for transferors. Compliance with subsection (c) should as-
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The safe harbor is met when:
(1) the standard form is reasonably accessible
electronically prior to initiation of the transfer at
issue;
(2) upon initiating the transfer, the transferee
has reasonable notice of and access to the standard
form before payment or, if there is no payment, before completion of the transfer;
(3) in the case of an electronic transfer of software, the transferee signifies agreement at the end
of or adjacent to the electronic standard form, or in
the case of a standard form printed on or attached
to packaged software or separately wrapped from
the software, the transferee does not exercise the
opportunity to return the software unopened for a
full refund within a reasonable time after the transfer; and
(4) the transferee can store and reproduce the
standard form if presented electronically. 6
The safe harbor, then, essentially validates clickwrap
agreements, providing a strong incentive for their use. It does
not, however, require providers to use clickwraps as a condition
of enforceability. In particular, as we note, there are occasions,
including in transactions involving open source software, in
which established custom counsels against requiring the click-

sure a transferor of the enforcement of the standard form, but failure to comply does not absolutely bar a transferor from otherwise proving transferee assent.") Comment c does, however, also note that "[I]n many instances, failure
to comply with the [safe harbor] should mean that the standard form will not
be enforceable because it fails the reasonable-transferor test of subsection
(b)." Id.
6 Id. § 2.0 2 (c).
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wrap.7 The general test of § 2.02(b) suffices for these transactions and, in many cases, will find that a contract has been
formed.
B. Express Warranty - Creationand Disclaimer
Some commentators at the conference expressed concern
about § 3.02 on the creation of express warranties as well as how
that section is to be interpreted consistently with § 3.06 on disclaimers. Specifically, some questioned why the Principles do not
require a showing of actual reliance for an express warranty to
exist. They also asked how § 3.06, which provides that disclaimers of express warranties are not enforceable, works with contract interpretation principles. That is, they raised the question
whether we intended courts to incorporate statements the transferee did not rely on into a fully integrated agreement in which
the parties indicated the exclusive sources on which they were
relying.
Section 3.02 on the creation of express warranties is quite
similar to UCC Article 2-313.8 Like 2-313, § 3.02 states that an

7 Id. § 2.02 cmt. b.
8 U.C.C. § 2-313 states that:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:

(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part
of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (2011).
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express warranty can be created by an affirmation of fact or
promise, a description, or a demonstration.9 Unlike 2-313, § 3.02
does not require that the affirmation, description, or demonstration form a part of the basis of the bargain. Rather, an express
warranty is formed if the assertion is one on which a reasonable
transferee could rely.10
As we discuss at length in the Principles, the UCC's basis of
the bargain test has proven difficult for courts to understand and
apply and has been at issue in many cases." The UCC's comments state that 2-313 was not intended to require particular reliance, leaving it to courts to attempt to discern what the term
"basis of the bargain" in the black letter was intended to mean.12
We believe that our formulation is consistent with both what the
UCC's drafters intended and courts have in fact been doing.
It is not the case that express warranties may not be disclaimed under the Principles. Under § 3.06(a), "Astatement intending to exclude or modify an express quality warranty is unenforceable if a reasonable person would not expect the
exclusion or modification."1 3 Thus, a disclaimer is enforceable if
a reasonable person would expect it. If (as in the hypothetical

9 ALI Principles, § 3.02(b) (explaining the ways in which a transferor might
make an express warranty]; UCC Art. 2-313 (listing the ways in which someone might make an express warranty).
10 Id. § 3.02(b). Comment b expressly states that the "basis of the bargain" test
is omitted from Section 3.02.
11Id. § 3.02 cmt. B (stating that the "basis of the bargain test" is "foggy" and has
caused much litigation).
12 See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2. Comment 2 state that, beyond the brief discussion
provided, "the matter is left to the case law with the intention that the policies
of this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they
arise." Id.
13 ALI Principles § 3.06(a).
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raised at the conference) a party agrees that they are relying on
only a limited number of representations, a court should find that
a reasonable person in that context could not rely on other representations or, in other words, would expect the disclaimer.
C. ContractingAround the Principles
Another question that arose at the conference was whether parties could opt out of the Principles as the governing law in
their agreement. For example, the parties might agree to a provision that states something akin to "The Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts shall not provide the rule of decision for matters arising under this agreement."
Of course, the Principles are not the law within a jurisdiction unless and until a legislative body adopts them as law or a
court looks to them to provide guidance, adopting a particular
rule set forth in the Principles as part of the common law. To
date, courts have generally decided software contracting cases
under either the Restatement or the UCC. To the extent that we
have simply reiterated rules that would apply in the absence of
the Principles-e.g., unconscionability, public policy-the parties
effectively cannot avoid the Principles by agreement. We are unsure why they would wish to. In such areas, we have collected
the then current cases and provided illustrations that we believe
would be helpful to both the parties and courts in determining
outcomes.
Of course, both the Restatement and UCC leave gaps. For
example, the Principles contain a section on automated disablement, 14 a topic that neither the Restatement nor the UCC express-

14

Id. § 4.03 (granting a specific remedy to transferors of software).
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ly addresses. In such cases, as well as ones in which the Principles modify what the other sources of law would provide, parties are free to provide that the Principles do not govern. Keep in
mind, however, that to the extent that a court finds the Principles'
approach to better state fundamental public policy, contracting
around the Principles would have no effect.
Our suggestion is that lawyers should familiarize themselves with the Principles before making a judgment counseling a
client to avoid them. In fact, there may be a number of places in
the Principles where we have taken positions that may prove
useful to a client in a particular context.
III. CONCLUSION

I am grateful to Suffolk University Law School and the conference
organizers for the chance to present the Principles to a diverse
audience. I also appreciate the opportunity to clear up some confusion and misperceptions regarding their content. The three
areas discussed above do not, unfortunately exhaust the items
which have raised questions. A common misconception that
seems to exist is that we have departed from traditional contract
law and required that all on-line agreements be characterized by
a click-wrap license requiring assent at the end. We hope, however, that most answers will be found in a careful reading of the
Principles themselves.

